



Raising limits on cash payments sends the wrong signal in Italy’s
fight against corruption
Many states have a limit on the size of payments that can legally be made in cash, with anything
above this limit needing to be transferred via traceable methods of payment such as bank transfers
or credit cards. As Andrea Lorenzo Capussela writes, Italy’s PM Matteo Renzi recently proposed
an increase in the country’s €1,000 threshold for cash payments up to a €3,000 limit. He argues that
the government’s measures are likely to undermine attempts to fight tax evasion and curb the
informal economy, noting that while the government itself may not be complicit in illegality, the
incentive structure that has led to this measure being proposed raises serious questions about Italy’s
capacity to tackle corruption.
In May, the Italian parliament passed an anti-corruption law. The bill was also intended to tighten the criminal
sanctions for accounting fraud: before it was approved, however, with the government’s consent four crucial words
were deleted from its text. Two weeks later, Italy’s Supreme Court certified that their deletion has effectively
liberalised accounting fraud. The government now wants to allow wider use of cash, which is limited in many
European states. The proposal before parliament is to treble the €1,000 threshold above which only traceable means
of payment – such as cards or bank transfers – can be used.
Neither measure is supported by serious justifications, and both are damaging. The cash threshold is intended to fight
tax evasion and curb the informal economy, and trebling it is unlikely to help. More importantly, accounting fraud
discourages investment and is the usual companion of both corruption – businesses must falsify their accounts to
create the slush funds out of which bribes are typically drawn – and tax evasion: decriminalising can only harm
economic growth and make corruption and tax evasion easier.
Admittedly, corruption and tax evasion are already so widespread in Italy that neither of these two measures is likely
to increase them significantly. Their most damaging effect is indirect. The two choices of the government, and their
remarkable consistency, shall harm the credibility, and therefore also the effectiveness, of Italy’s effort to fight
corruption and tax evasion, because they signal, openly, that the government’s reform programme does not really aim
at the roots of the country’s governance problems.
The question is why. And it is an important question because the pervasiveness of illegality – not just corruption and
tax evasion, but also organized crime and the worst forms of clientelism – is arguably the most conspicuous
difference between Italy and its peers, and a decisive cause of its economic problems.
The answer is not to be found, I would argue, in the quality of the present government, which may not be ideal but
seems better than most past ones and probably superior also to any realistic alternative. The problem rather lies in
the incentives under which the government operates (I refer here to those strands of the politico-economic literature
associated with the writings of Douglass North, Dani Rodrik, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson).
Incentives that are shaped, in turn, by the logic of Italy’s increasingly vertical, personalized, mediatized political
system (described, among others, by Marco Revelli), which tends to discourage electoral and political participation,
stifle public debate, undermine intermediate organizations, and weaken political accountability, while strengthening
the influence of special interests.
If organized interest groups demand policies beneficial to them but harmful to the public interest, those incentives are
Matteo Renzi in Sesto Fiorentino. Credits: Alex Valli / Wikimedia Commons
(CC BY-SA 2.0)
likely to lead the government to oblige, because the citizens who bear the cost, in often imperceptible measure,
generally lack the information, the spur, and the organization to react collectively. They typically remain silent – as
described in Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action and the literature it spawned. Yet their silence reinforces that
logic, for political accountability atrophies if it is rarely enforced.
Hence the origin of those two apparently
incomprehensible measures: organized interest
groups – business and retailers’ associations,
presumably – demanded them. The segments of the
governing coalition that have their voters and
clienteles in those sectors supported them. There was
no countervailing force to lean against their pressure.
So the government accepted their demands, in the
knowledge that neither its voters nor the citizens at
large would have protested. Rejecting them would
merely have weakened the government’s political
support and, with it, its ability to implement its
ambitious (and widely praised) reform programme.
One could retort that favouring illegality contradicts
much of that programme, or else argue, more radically,
that the government ought to have rejected those
demands out of principle. But this would lead us to a
discussion about ends and means, or politics and
morality, which is as legitimate as it is distant from the
reality of Italian politics. For those arguments clash with the fact that in a short-term perspective the logic of the
government’s choices is as cogent as it appears cynical: it was rational for it to decriminalise accounting fraud, which
has already yielded a net political benefit, and now to propose expanding the scope for anonymous cash payments,
expecting a similar yield.
If that is the problem, the solution can hardly come from within the political system. As argued by Machiavelli – e.g., in
Discourses, I.18 – well-ordered republics rest on ‘civic virtue’: not in the perfectionist sense, but in the sense that the
citizens’ willingness to act publicly for the public interest is truly the backbone of a functioning republic. A plausible
reading of Italy’s governance problems, in fact, suggests that only the collective action of citizens can reverse the
logic I have sketched above.
Collective action is hard to organize, however, because few effective intermediate organizations remain, and much of
the electorate seems in the grips of a passive, resigned form of distrust for politics. Berlusconi gone, moreover, civic
engagement has lost a scandalous but convenient adversary to rally against: now collective action must aim at a
more elusive target – the inefficiency of the political system, which Berlusconi exploited, symbolised, and
exacerbated.
Yet, were citizens to succeed in imposing a political price on the government for disregarding the public interest they
would begin to alter its incentives, by strengthening political accountability. And progress would be sustainable, for
success breeds audacity.
The good news is that on the trebling of the cash threshold there was a reaction. An anti-corruption organization,
which is part of a broader European network, has launched a petition to persuade the government to change its mind
(disclosure: I was involved). The petition has attracted a rather large number of signatures (almost 45,000 as of this
writing) for Italian standards, and the attention of Italy’s main newspaper, which has published a long article by one of
its most prominent journalists.
Of course, Italy’s post-war history does not lack examples of civic mobilization. But this initiative is a rare one, since
Italy has returned to political normalcy after the height of the Eurozone crisis: should it succeed, the evolution of
Italy’s political system could begin to change.
Small as it may seem, therefore, this episode deserves some attention also from abroad. Because corruption and tax
evasion weigh heavily on Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio, which remains the biggest latent threat to the survival of the euro.
And because a more open democracy can better discuss, and more effectively implement, the deep changes that
Italy must undergo in order to become not just a better state for its citizens, but also a better partner for its European
peers, as they discuss the future of Europe.
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